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UPDATE ON
OIL & GAS LAW

Thomas A. Daily

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NATURAL RESOURCES LAW - 2007
BY THOMAS A. DAILY 1
It has been an eventful year. There is much to tell. Lets get started.
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS REVERSES SUMMARY JUDGMENT
VOIDING MINERAL QUIET TITLE DECREE
John and Darla Verkamp’s predecessors secured a quiet title decree to both surface and minerals in 1976. The decree was
obtained by default, upon constructive service. The only factual basis stated for the decree was adverse possession which, as to minerals,
was provably false. 2 Sonat Exploration Company, the predecessor of XTO Energy Inc., obtained an oil and gas lease from the Verkamps 3
and integrated the interest of the prior severed mineral owner. At XTO’s request, Floyd E. Sagley Properties, LTD, the unit operator,
suspended royalties on the interest.
The Verkamps sued Sagely and XTO, relying upon the 1976 decree. XTO and Sagely moved for summary judgment that the
1976 decree was void as to the severed mineral interest. In support of the motion, they attached a title opinion prepared by J. H. Evans, who
had opined that the decree was likely subject to collateral attack for lack of notice, and was based upon provably false alleged facts. The
circuit court granted summary judgment to Sagely and XTO.
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Member, Daily & Woods, P.L.L.C., Fort Smith, Arkansas
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As we all know, you can only adversely possess against a severed mineral owner by actually producing the minerals. That had
not happened.
3

Purely for protection.
2

The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. 4 The court said that Mr. Evans’ opinion, which was unsworn, could not support
the summary judgment and that Sagely and XTO had offered no proof that the severed mineral owners could have been notified of the 1976
proceedings even if reasonable diligence had been exercised.
The Court of Appeals instructed that if Sagely and XTO sought to be protected from potential double exposure, they should have
interpleaded the royalties from the well and added the severed mineral owners to the suit.
SUPREME COURT REAFFIRMS ITS PRIOR RULING IN SMITH V. AJ&K CASE
One of my favorite recent decisions of the Arkansas Supreme Court is its case of AJ&K Operating Co. v. Smith. 5 Remember?
That was the case where the landowners contended that the oil companies had contaminated their land, but did not want the land cleaned up,
because that would have messed up their lawsuit against the oil companies. The Supreme Court reversed an injunction barring the cleanup.
The Court held that cleanup was the preferred remedy for the landowners and was in the interest of the state and its regulatory agencies.

4
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Verkamp v. Sagely, ___ Ark. App. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006).
355 Ark. 510, 140 S.W.3d 475 (2005).
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Well, the landowners were persistent. When the circuit judge, who was wrong to enjoin cleanup the first time, lifted his
injunction so that cleanup could occur, the landowners appealed that order. The Supreme Court wasted little time on this one, making
clear that it meant what it had already said. 6
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT AFFIRMS JURISDICTION OF A.O.G.C.
OVER CERTAIN JOA DISPUTES
Great Lakes Chemical Corporation operates three brine units in Union County.
Albemarle Corporation has similar brine operations in Columbia County but has, at least
for the present, avoided forming units. Both companies process the brine to extract
elemental bromine, some of which they sell, but most of which they incorporate into other
chemical products.
Great Lakes formed its units in 1995 and 1996 under the provisions of the
Arkansas Brine Conservation Act 7 when it was being sued by unleased mineral owners
of lands near its facilities, who claimed mineral trespass resultant from the water flood
nature of the brine production operations.
The unitization statute requires the applicant to present a plan of operations with
estimates of costs and revenues from brine production. At the time its unitization
applications were presented, Great Lakes had a rather primitive cost accounting system.
It tracked costs from major expense categories, but allocated those costs based only
upon estimated percentages. When it came time to allocate estimated costs between
the brine units and those Great Lakes facilities, such as pipelines and processing plants,
which were not part of the units, a lot of percentage allocation took place. Some of that
6
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Smith v. AJ& K Operating Company, ____ Ark. ____, ____ S.W.2d ____ (2006).
A.C.A. §15-76-301 et. seq.
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was pretty wrong.
Albemarle obtained a major brine lease within Great Lakes West Plant Unit from
Murphy Oil Corporation, as well as a number of other leases from smaller companies.
Murphy had previously elected to participate under the A.O.G.C.’s unitization order, so
the interest was subject to the unit operating agreement approved by the A.O.G.C. At
first, Albemarle resold its proportionate share of brine to Great Lakes but, ultimately, it
built a bromine plant and began taking brine in kind.
Meanwhile, Great Lakes updated its cost accounting system, world wide, installing
industry standard SAP accounting. Neither Albemarle nor the A.O.G.C. were asked, or
even told, about the change. The result of SAP was better, more accurate, cost
accounting, but it resulted in higher joint interest bills to Albemarle and other unit
participants.
Albemarle filed an application before the A.O.G.C. seeking an order directing
Great Lakes to revert to its prior accounting methodology. Ultimately the A.O.G.C.
granted Albemarle’s application, overruling Great Lakes’ challenges to its exercise of
jurisdiction over a COPAS dispute. Both the circuit court of Union County and the
Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the A.O.G.C. 8
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Great Lakes v. Bruner, ___ Ark. ____, ____ S.W.3d ____ (2006).
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The significance of this decision to the oil and gas industry is, as yet,
undetermined. It may be great. Virtually every gas well is drilled after the operator
secures an integration order. That order routinely incorporates an operating agreement.
Indeed, the A.O.G.C. has taken the seminal step of dictating a standard form operating
agreement. Under the logic of the Great Lakes decision, any participant who elects to
participate under the A.O.G.C.’s integration order may request the A.O.G.C. to then
interpret and enforce the operating agreement, rather than litigating a JOA dispute in
court.
The A.O.G.C. is not a court. At any given time one, maybe two of its members will
have attended law school. Contract interpretation is traditionally a matter of law, decided
by the court as such and not submitted to a jury. Such decisions are then reviewed by an
appellate court de novo. However, the administrative process is different. The agency
is virtually presumed right. Distinctions between law and fact are blurred. Watch out
folks. This is one slippery slope.
CONFUSING SEISMIC TRESPASS CASE HEADED FOR ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT
You have heard the term “runaway jury”, right? Well then, how do you feel about
a runaway judge. We are not talking about a jurist who failed to show up for court, either.
El Paso Exploration Company v. Blanchard 9 is an example of a runaway judge who
stayed in the courtroom. As they say, however, “bad facts make bad law,” and this case
has enough bad facts to repeal the ten commandments.
It all started when the A.O.G.C. enacted something called General Rule B-42,
9

Columbia County, Arkansas Circuit Court Case No. E-98-212-5, consolidated with No. CIV-98-137-5, currently docketed on
appeal as Case No. CA-06-1107.
6

regulating seismic exploration. That rule, as originally enacted, 10 provided:
No entry shall be made by the permitee upon the lands upon which such
seismic operations are to be conducted without the permitee having first
secured a permit from the landowner authorizing such operation to be
conducted. (emphasis added)

10

The rule has since been amended to remove the problem which started the judge running in Blanchard.
7

James Blanchard is clearly a “landowner.” He owns the surface and a one-half
mineral interest under the tract involved in the litigation. Blanchard gave an oil and gas
lease to a company named Swift Energy Company. That lease authorized, among other
things, exclusive geophysical operations. The lease also prohibited assignment without
Blanchard’s consent. 11
The other one-half mineral interest was leased to El Paso’s predecessor, Sonat.
That lease also authorized geophysical operations. Swift and Sonat entered into an
agreement whereby each became obligated to permit certain seismic operations
conducted by the other and acquired the right to purchase a license to the data.
Apparently pursuant to this agreement, 12 Swift permitted Sonat to conduct seismic
operations on its lease from Blanchard.
As luck would have it, Blanchard is an extremely disgruntled Sonat ex-employee.
He apparently even claims to still have festering knife wounds resultant from an
altercation with another Sonat employee. Under no circumstances would Blanchard
permit Sonat to conduct seismic operations upon his land. When Sonat’s contractor
approached him for a permit, Blanchard refused.
Sonat applied for and received a temporary restraining order allowing access to
Blanchard’s land. The seismic was conducted with very little surface damage, but,
unfortunately, no promising discoveries of potential hydrocarbons.

11
12

agreement.

Which could not be unreasonably withheld.
There are some inferences in the briefs that Swift actually permitted Sonat to conduct operations beyond those covered in the

8

Meanwhile, Blanchard made a discovery of his own, A.O.G.C. General Rule B-42,
and counterclaimed, alleging trespass, surface damages under the express provisions of
the Swift lease and interference with contract 13 by Sonat.
After years of motions, every one of which Sonat lost, Sonat 14 lost again in a
bench trial. The circuit judge held that Sonat, by not obtaining Blanchard’s express
permission, had violated General Rule B-42, and was thus a trespasser. He further held
that Swift’s purported attempt to permit Sonat’s operation was precluded by the
prohibition against assignment in the Swift lease. Finally, he agreed with Blanchard that
Sonat had interfered with Blanchard’s contract with Swift. It was then that things really
went bad for Sonat.
In addition to surface damages, apparently awarded twice, 15 the circuit judge
awarded Blanchard $260,000 on a strange theory of unjust enrichment. The calculation
is interesting, to say the least. The circuit judge took the average AFE dry hole cost of
several wells in the vicinity and subtracted the cost of the seismic line shot by Sonat. He
concluded that Sonat saved $260,000 by condemning the acreage with the seismic lline,
rather than by drilling a dry hole. Then, through unexplained reasoning, he awarded that
savings to Blanchard as a windfall. Mercifully, the circuit judge denied Blanchard’s
request for punitive damages.

13
14
15

The Swift lease.
By then, El Paso.
Once for breach of contract and then again for interference with the same contract. Go figure.
9

Sonat has appealed. This case should go straight to the Supreme Court. The
resultant opinion may very well teach us the answers to a few Arkansas unknowns, such
as whether a severed mineral owner may permit seismic operations against the wishes of
the surface owner. It certainly ought to be reversed, at least as to the
dry-hole-minus-seismic damage award. However, I remember saying that about
SEECO v. Hales, 16 so let us wait and see.
OKLAHOMA COURT AFFIRMS MALICIOUS PROSECUTION JUDGMENT
AGAINST PRODUCER WHICH OBTAINED T.R.O. ON FALSE STATEMENTS
The above discussion of Blanchard should cause us to wonder whether we need
to keep getting those handy temporary restraining orders. Sure, T.R.O.’s are quick and
easy. Post a little bond, get back to work. No notice, no nasty trial, just file the
complaint, visit in the judge’s office, and send the sheriff out with a court order.
That is apparently what Tidewater Petroleum Corporation had in mind when Philip
and Joe Bill Lierly refused to allow Tidewater to use a road which they were constructing
on their property for access to its wells, in lieu of the awkward existing lease road. In its
complaint Tidewater gilded its lily a bit. It alleged, falsely, that the Lierlys had denied it
access to its wells. 17 When the dust had settled Tidewater was denied its requested
injunction, was sued for malicious prosecution, and was on its way to the Oklahoma
Supreme Court with a loser of an appeal. 18
ILLINOIS COURT OF APPEALS BUCKS TREND 16
17
18

330 Ark. 402, 954 S.W.2d 234 (1997).
Not true, there was another road in use at the time which remained available.

Tidewater Petroleum Corporation v. Lierly, 139 P.3d 897 (Okla 2006).
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HOLDS THAT COAL BED METHANE BELONGS TO COAL OWNER
There is no Arkansas decision whether, when gas and coal are separately owned,
coal bed methane belongs to the gas or the coal owner. There is a split of authority
nationally, with most of the recent decisions going to the gas owner. However, there are
still jurisdictions, particularly eastern coal mining states, which go the other way. So
went the Illinois Court of Appeals, Fifth District in the case of Continental Resources of
Illinois, Inc. v. Illinois Methane, LLC. 19
Coal bed methane is being developed today in Western Arkansas. Indeed, there
is a currently pending interpleader action involving this very issue. The last such
interpleader case was settled, but this one involves a different coal owner. If this issue
ever gets to the Arkansas Supreme Court, I will bet on the gas owner, but it is not a sure
thing.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS INTERPRETS ROYALTY RESERVATION CORRECTLY
In Stewman Ranch, Inc. V. Double M. Ranch, Inc., 20 the Texas Court of Appeals
interpreted the following language in a warranty deed from Stewman to Double M. Ranch:
There is, however, excepted and reserved to the Grantors an undivided
one-half (1/2) of the royalties to be paid on the production of oil, gas, and
other hydrocarbons from the described lands which are presently owned by
Grantors for and during the lives of Helen A. Stewman and O. T. Stewman,
Jr. and, upon the death of the survivor of them, this retained royalty interest
will vest in Grantee, its successors and assigns.

19
20

364 Ill. App. 3d 691, 301 Ill Dec. 887, 847 N.E. 2d 897 (2006).
192 S.W. 3d 808 (Tex. App. Dist 11 2006).
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The deed also excepted prior mineral reservations, thus obviating any Duhig
issue. The Stewmans contended that the phrase “which are presently owned” modified
“lands,” thus giving them a net reservation of one-half, regardless of the extent of prior
reservations. Double M. Ranch contended, successfully, that “which are presently
owned” modified “royalties to be paid” and that the Stewmans thus reserved only one-half
of whatever interest they had immediately prior to the conveyance. The Appeals court
agreed with that interpretation.
Had I examined this title I would have gone with the Double M. Ranch
interpretation, so I am pleased with the decision.
TEXAS SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT JOA PARTY ASSIGNING
INTEREST REMAINS LIABLE FOR JIB EXPENSES
The oil and gas industry sometimes pays little attention to its contracts, instead,
pretending that custom can override over express contract terms. We have seen an
example of this when courts remind us that Maintanance of Uniform Interest is an express
JOA provision, not subject to amendment by industry custom. Another example comes
to us in the form of Seagull Energy E&P v. Eland Energy Inc. 21 Eland, a party to the unit
JOA, assigned all of its unit interest to Nor-Tex Gas Corporation. Nor-Tex failed to pay
joint interest bills from Seagull, the unit operator. Seagull sued Eland, which contended
that its assignment relieved it of future liability.
The Texas Supreme Court did not agree. There is no express provision of the
JOA which would convert a unilateral assignment of a party’s JOA interest into a novation.
The common law of contract is that an assignor remains liable for the performance by its
21

____ S.W.3d ____ (Tex. 2006)
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assignee. Next time, Eland, assign to someone who pays its bills.
The legal analysis seems correct, though I suspect most of us would have guessed
the opposite result, based upon our understanding of industry custom.
WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS HOLDS “AT THE WELL”
LANGUAGE AMBIGUOUS, DISALLOWS CHARGING ROYALTY
OWNERS FOR ANY POST-PRODUCTION COSTS
Whether, and to what extent, post-production costs are proportionately
changeable to royalty owners remains a chaotically uncertain issue. Modern gas
marketing methods almost never involve sales at the well. However, most leases
measure the royalty calculation at that place. Thus, producers, and some courts have
created calculated prices “at the well” for royalty calculation purposes, by netting back
costs of gathering, transportation, dehydration, compression, etc. necessary to transport
the gas to market and make it saleable. Courts appear increasingly less tolerant of that
practice, despite that it makes perfect sense.
In Goff v. Columbia Natural Resources, LLC22 the West Virginia Court of Appeals
refused to buy the “at the well” argument. That court acknowledged the split of authority
nationally, but found “at the well” to be ambiguous and not a justification for netting back
post-production costs. Apparently, in West Virginia, the royalty owner will get his fraction
of the gross sale price of the gas, regardless of where and how sold.
KANSAS COURT OF APPEALS HOLDS HABENDUM CLAUSE TRUMPS PUGH CLAUSE
In Schwatken v. Explorer Resources, Inc., et. all 23 the Kansas court of appeals
22
23

219 W. Va. 266, 633 S.E.2d 22 (2006).
24 Kan. App. 2d 873, 125 P.3d 1078 (2006).
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was required to interpret an oil and gas lease containing an apparent internal conflict.
The lease contained a pretty typical Habendum Clause containing the language:
If, at the expiration of the primary term of this lease, oil or gas is not being
produced on the leased premises or on acreage pooled therewith, but
Lessee is then engaged in drilling, reworking, or dewatering operations
thereon, then this lease shall continue in force so long as dewatering or
drilling operations are being continuously prosecuted...
There was also a Pugh Clause which provided:
It is agreed that at the end of the primary term, this lease shall expire as to
all lands located outside of a producing unit.
As luck would have it, the first well on the lease was commenced prior to the
expiration of the primary term, but was not completed and put into production until after
the primary term had expired.
The Schwatkens argued that the Pugh Clause, which they drafted, prevailed.
Thus, they reasoned, they got a free well. The court held otherwise. Under the specific
language of the Habendum Clause, actively conducting operations is a complete
substitute for production, not only for purposes of that clause, but for the remainder of the
lease, as well, including the Pugh Clause. This was a good decision. The result urged
by the Schwatkens would have rendered a significant portion of the Habendum Clause of
the lease meaningless and give them an unconscionable windfall.
A.O.G.C. REVISES RULES AND POLICIES
It was an active year for the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission. With the
continuation of intense development of the Fayetteville Shale play, two day integration
dockets have returned. Those two day dockets would be three or four day dockets had
the Commission not enacted rules and procedures to streamline the process. As an
14

example, new General Rule B-43 obviates separate field rules for units east of Pope
County. The Commission’s new standardized operating agreement should save time
and energy, as well, by ending arguments over individual JOA provisions 24
Another major time saver is the Commission’s amended General Rule B-40 which
provides authorization for the Director of Production and Conservation to administratively
approve applications for exceptional well locations (wells located closer to unit
boundaries than otherwise permitted) and to impose a penalty upon the well’s production
allowable.
The revisions to General Rule B-40 permit administrative approval, not
withstanding the extent of the penalty, 25 and have untied the administrative location
process from the hearing docket, thus shortening the time required to obtain approval.
Take note that there is an official application form published on the A.O.G.C.’s website.
The A.O.G.C. staff takes the position that the use of this form is mandatory.
OH NO! IT IS ANOTHER LEGISLATIVE YEAR
Every other year, whether we need it or not, 26 our legislators wander out of the
hills and bayous to descend upon capital city. Usually that makes for an odd year
indeed.

24

We will not discuss General Rule B-43 or the standardized operating agreement in detail here. Each is the subject of a separate
paper presented at this Institute.
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Previously, if the calculated penalty exceeded 50%, the application required a hearing before the full commission.
I firmly side with the nots on this one.
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Watch out for bills attempting to limit surface access. There is a militant group of
well haters down in South Logan County who can shout with the best of them. These
folks, many of whom purchased their lands knowing full well that they owned no minerals,
see no good reason for oil and gas exploration. They have the ear of a few legislators
who are showing some determination. The problem is that a lot more legislators do not
care, one way or the other. The way deals get made in the capital, we could be in
trouble.
Also expect legislative attempts to divest severed mineral owners of their property.
Surface owners who own less than 100% of the minerals under their surface are
powerfully jealous of their neighbors who get paid big bonuses. Indeed, this may be the
year that some kind of mineral prescription bill actually becomes law. 27
As the session has just begun, it is too soon to predict the full extent of the mischief
to be expected. We will know more soon and I will report then. Stay tuned.

27

Some of us have actually helped draft a severed mineral abandonment bill designed to be workable and constitutional.
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